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Chapter 6 
What Kind of Knowledge is Needed about Toxicant-Related Health Issues? 
Some Lessons Drawn from the Seveso Dioxin Case 
Laura Centemeri 
 
<FL> Dioxins, a class of chemical contaminants produced in both natural and industrial 
processes, were discovered in the late 1950s and have been extensively studied since the early 
1970s. The majority of studies have focused on the most toxic congener, 2,3,7,8-TCDD, simply 
called dioxin,
1
 with much toxicology, biochemistry, and epidemiology research having been 
aimed at determining its effects on humans, in particular its carcinogenic effects. Nevertheless, 
despite thirty years of intensive research, exactly how dangerous dioxin is remains a 
controversial issue. In 1997 the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) classified 
TCDD as a group 1 carcinogen based on limited evidence on humans, sufficient evidence on 
animals, and extensive mechanistic information. This classification has stirred controversy, in 
particular concerning the use of mechanistic data to interpret cancer risk in humans (Cole et al. 
2003; Steenland et al. 2004). In 2009, IARC confirmed the inclusion of TCDD in group 1, citing 
sufficient epidemiological evidence for all cancers combined (Baan et al. 2009).  
All the direct evidence on acute dioxin effects on human health comes from 
epidemiological studies of human populations exposed accidentally or occupationally to elevated 
dioxin levels. One of the cases most studied in the dioxin carcinogenicity literature concerns the 
population living in the area of Seveso, Italy. In 1976 an industrial accident in the chemical 
factory ICMESA (owned by the Swiss multinational corporation Roche) exposed the residents of 
the surrounding area—in particular the inhabitants of Seveso, Meda, Cesano Maderno, and 
 Desio—to the highest exposure to TCDD known to have occurred in humans (Eskenazi et al. 
2001). To quote an epidemiologist involved in the follow-up studies investigating the health 
consequences for the population affected: “The accident was a tragedy, for sure, but for us 
scientists, I must admit, it has been a rare chance to have a sort of laboratory situation, so to 
explore how dioxin works on human beings.”
2 
This chapter focuses on the paradox of this 
“laboratory population” that is playing such a crucial role in the controversy concerning dioxin 
carcinogenicity.  
The paradox is as follows: the vast scientific output concerning dioxin effects in Seveso is 
having no impact in terms of public health measures implemented in the area affected, in 
particular as far as prevention is concerned. This scientific output is oriented exclusively around 
the problems and discussions that have emerged over the uncertainties surrounding dioxin 
toxicity and the problem of its regulation.  
At the same time, the population affected has not engaged in collective action to seek full 
disclosure of the impact of dioxin contamination or of epidemiological studies concerned with 
local environmental health and prevention. In the ICMESA disaster area, environmental health—
and most specifically long-term dioxin health effects—are not questions of public concern and 
mobilization, but they are rather the source mostly of “rumors” circulating in the community, or 
of the personal troubles of those directly touched by diseases that might be linked to dioxin 
exposure. Using a dichotomy introduced by Charles Wright Mills (1959), dioxin in Seveso is not 
a public “issue” but a matter of personal “troubles.”
3
  
In this paper, I discuss how this double framing of dioxin’s long-term health effects—
either as a pure scientific problem or as purely personal troubles—has emerged. The hypothesis I 
advance is that this double framing has affected the kind of scientific knowledge produced on 
  
local effects of dioxin contamination. Moreover, the Seveso case shows how the global 
regulation of toxicants relies on a very specific kind of knowledge, focused on the issue of 
carcinogenicity and employing a mono-causal explicative model of the onset of cancers. There is 
a gap between this kind of knowledge output meant for regulation and the knowledge relevant 
for the implementation of local prevention policies to assure environmental health.  
In order to develop this argument, I will first analyze the responses to the Seveso disaster, 
in particular the choices made by the public authorities (at the regional and national levels) to 
manage the crisis. The role of the public authorities in responding to the dioxin contamination 
emerges as crucial when trying to give an account of the specific way in which dioxin was 
interpreted as a collective threat by the population affected. I will then focus on the local pressure 
groups and the conflicting interpretations of dioxin risk they supported. Through investigating 
the dynamics of these organizations and their interplay with the public authorities’ crisis 
management approach, I show how the dioxin risk was never framed as a problem of public 
health in the area affected. I also show how an interpretation of dioxin as a cultural threat came 
to prevail among the population exposed to the contamination. This prevailing interpretation of 
dioxin seems to have acted as an obstacle against any popular movement toward asking the 
public authorities to respond to environmental health problems in the contaminated area. These 
problems are related not only to the dioxin contamination but also more generally to the chronic 
chemical pollution caused by chemical factories located in the area since the 1950s.   
In the final section, I discuss the lessons from the Seveso case about the construction of 
environmental risks as public problems, and in particular the role played by participation, which 
is to be understood here as meaning dialogue among scientists, citizens, activists, and public 
authorities. This dialogue seems to be necessary to prompt scientific research to address health 
  
issues not in terms of individual problems but as part of the condition of local populations. This 
dialogue is also necessary to ensure that issues of uncertainty, which are ubiquitous in the study 
of toxicants, are not dealt with only within restricted circles of scientists but in public arenas in 
which priorities—for research and action—can be defined in a more democratic way, that is, in a 
more inclusive plural way. When this dialogue fails, research on environmental health issues 
becomes more easily detachable from its geographical dimension, and tends to focus exclusively 
on a laboratory approach that only partially responds to public health concerns. Moreover, this 
approach obscures under a veil of objectivity the political dimensions of making regulatory 
choices in situations involving uncertain scientific knowledge. 
 
<HDA> Seveso: The Disaster and the Response of the Public Authorities  
<FL> It is always difficult to give a concise description of a disaster and its consequences when 
addressing the problem from a sociological point of view. The official “toll of the tragedy” is 
often the object of endless controversy and, moreover, it tells nothing of the long-term impact of 
an event on the community affected. A variety of sociopolitical processes, including framing 
processes, shape disasters, making them generative of social change. These processes take place 
at different times and in different, but intertwined, public arenas: local and global political 
arenas, and expert arenas, in particular legal and scientific ones (Jasanoff 1994).   
The main feature of the Seveso disaster is that it was the first major accident in the 
chemical industry at the European level. It contributed to the definition of the European directive 
(Directive 82/501/EEC, the “Seveso Directive”) on the major-accident hazards of certain 
industrial activities (De Marchi, Funtowicz, and Ravetz 1996; De Marchi 1997; De Marchi, 
Funtowicz, and Guimares Pereira 2001). Another important feature is that “there were no 
  
fatalities following the accident,” as Stavros Dimas, European Commissioner for the 
Environment, stated when commemorating its thirtieth anniversary in 2006.
4
 In fact, at the 
European level, the Seveso disaster is considered an “information disaster” (van Eijndhoven 
1994). It helped to highlight the fact that a lack of information about hazardous industrial 
processes is a major source of vulnerability in our highly industrialized societies.  
To quote Dimas again: “The reason for this particular accident becoming such a symbol is 
because it exposed the serious flaws in the response to industrial accidents.” The absence of 
“fatalities,” connected to the recovery of the contaminated area (Ramondetta and Repossi 1998), 
also explains why eco-skeptic books often cite the case of Seveso as an example of “unjustified 
alarmism” (Kohler 2002). 
This emphasis on the event itself and its consequences has completely concealed the 
reality of a community exposed to chemical pollution since 1945. This reality has never been 
seriously investigated in terms of its human and environmental costs. The harmfulness of 
ICMESA, even though known to the local community, became a public concern only with the 
accident of July 1976 and merely in terms of the specific consequences of dioxin contamination. 
Moreover, although there has not been the health catastrophe expected by some back in 1976, 
dioxin contamination has affected people’s health with various degrees of gravity. A 25-year 
follow-up study of mortality in the population exposed shows excesses of lymphatic and 
hematopoietic tissue neoplasms, diabetes mellitus, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
(Consonni et al. 2008). A more recent study examining the relation of serum TCDD with cancer 
incidence in 981 women from the most contaminated areas—and part of the wider project Seveso 
Women’s Health Study run by researchers of the School of Public Health, University of 
California, Berkeley—shows a significantly positive all-cancer incidence in this cohort, thirty 
  
years after the accident (Werner et al. 2011). 
In spite of the disaster, its direct effects, and the reality of previous chronic pollution that 
it brought to light, the issue of environmental health has never been a cause for public concern or 
activism in the communities affected, thus contributing to the absence of this issue in local public 
debate. At the same time, the Seveso case has been extensively studied by epidemiologists within 
the frame of research on the toxic effects of dioxin on human beings. This scientific output has 
had no impact on the area directly concerned, either in terms of local public health policies or 
victims’ mobilization. How can this paradox be explained? 
In order to develop our analysis, we first need to introduce some context. Seveso is a town 
of twenty thousand inhabitants, located 15 km north of Milan, the regional capital of Lombardy, 
in the geographical area known as Brianza Milanese. Brianza is a “district area” (Bagnasco 
1977) with a strong Catholic cultural tradition, specializing in furniture production and design by 
small, family-owned firms. After World War II, chemical companies began to install plants in 
the area because of the rich water resources and the good transport infrastructure. Thus, two 
different models of production organization and integration came to coexist in the area. The 
accident at the origin of the Seveso disaster occurred in the ICMESA chemical plant (located at 
Meda, near Seveso), which had 170 workers and had been owned since 1963 by the Swiss 
multinational corporation Roche through its subsidiary Givaudan. It produced intermediate 
compounds for the cosmetics and pharmaceutical industry among which, since 1969 and more 
intensively in the 1970s, was 2,4,5-trichlorophenol (TCP), an inflammable toxic compound used 
for the chemical synthesis of herbicides.
5
 
On Saturday, 10 July 1976 at around 12:30 A.M., the reactor where trichlorophenol was 
produced released a toxic cloud of dioxin and other pollutants because of a sudden exothermic 
  
reaction caused by the breakdown of a safety valve.
6
 The hazardous gas produced by the twenty-
minute emission settled on a large area of about 1,810 hectares in the municipalities of Seveso, 
Meda, Desio, Cesano Maderno, and, although to a less serious extent, seven other municipalities 
in the province of Milan. 
The 2,3,7,8-tetrachloro-dibenzo-para-dioxin (TCDD), simply called dioxin that was 
released by the ICMESA reactor
7
 is an extremely dangerous molecule due to its very high 
toxicity, persistence, and stability. Nevertheless, dioxin was little known at the time of the 
accident.  
In 1976, knowledge of the extremely harmful effects of dioxin on human health was 
mostly based on suppositions resulting from toxicological evidence. There had been few 
epidemiological studies and they had been limited to following up on cohorts of industrial 
workers. Dioxin environmental contamination affecting an entire population was without 
precedent. Scientists were unable to anticipate the damage to be expected (to the environment, 
animals, or human beings of varying sex and age) and neither were they able to provide 
decontamination methods. Besides, there were no technical instruments to measure human blood 
dioxin levels (Mocarelli 2001). The result was a “radical uncertainty” (Callon, Lascoumes, and 
Barthe 2001) surrounding the consequences of the contamination to be expected for human 
health and the environment, and their extent in both space and time. There was just one certainty: 
the extreme toxicity of dioxin proven in laboratory tests. This led to fears of catastrophic 
scenarios. 
These catastrophic scenarios, however, did not materialize immediately after the accident. 
The toxic cloud passed largely unnoticed, with the Seveso and Meda people considering it just a 
“usual” nuisance, one in a long series. A “week of silence” (Fratter 2006) passed, but in the 
  
meantime various alarming phenomena were noticed in the area near ICMESA: a sudden fall of 
leaves; the deaths of small animals (birds and cats); and a “mysterious” skin disease (chloracne) 
affecting children. Anxiety grew among the population. On 19 July, Roche experts informed the 
Italian public authorities that the accident at the ICMESA plant had caused widespread dioxin 
contamination and highly recommended the evacuation of part of Seveso’s and Meda’s 
populations as a precautionary measure.  
On 24 July the evacuation began: 736 inhabitants of Seveso and Meda were forced to 
leave their houses with all their personal belongings inside. Two hundred people never returned 
to their houses, which were demolished during the decontamination. “Risk zones”
8
 were created, 
officially on the basis of the estimated trajectory of the toxic cloud and of random dioxin 
concentration tests on the ground. In fact, the criteria adopted to delimit risk zones also included 
practical feasibility and the reduction of the negative social side effects that were to be expected 
in the case of massive displacements.  
The design of the risk zones implied a delimitation of the area officially considered “at 
risk.” Faced with widespread contamination probably affecting a large and difficult-to-define 
area, the public authorities tried to reduce the “risk” area to the minimum. This reduction of the 
crisis area had the effect of producing an overlap between the district of Seveso—and its 
population—and the area at risk. Of the municipalities affected, it was Seveso that became the 
only one constantly associated with the crisis, particularly in the media. The association of the 
name Seveso with dioxin was considered a form of injustice by its citizens. It appeared to them 
that the regional and national authorities had decided to sacrifice them in order to reduce the 
extent of the crisis.  
This clear-cut definition of the area at risk was just one of the measures adopted to reduce 
  
the uncertainty that the public authorities were confronted with. In fact, the authorities further 
decided to reduce uncertainty by denying it, by acting “as if” there were none. Another measure 
was the creation of Technical-Scientific Committees of experts in charge of deciding on the steps 
to be taken to manage the dioxin health risk, decontamination, and the socioeconomic 
implications of the crisis. The definition of the problems at stake was delegated entirely to the 
experts. These committees were in fact taking decisions of a political nature and were therefore 
not just advisory committees (Centemeri 2006: 87–96). 
With the public authorities embracing a “paternalistic stance” (Conti 1977), the citizens—
and their political representatives at the municipal level—were not allowed to participate in 
decision making. Nevertheless, decisions were made that greatly affected them, as persons and as 
a community. In particular, given the suspected teratogenic effects of dioxin, pregnant women 
from the contaminated area (within the third month of pregnancy) were “left free” to ask for a 
medical abortion. Abortion was still illegal in Italy, and in fact the Italian social movements’ 
fight for its depenalization was at its peak.
9
 About thirty women from the contaminated area—
although the precise number is not known—decided to interrupt their pregnancies (Ferrara 1977). 
 
<HDA> From Scientific Controversy to Cultural Conflict: Rival Local Interpretations of 
the Dioxin Crisis 
<FL> Given the radical uncertainty surrounding the effects of dioxin, it was clear to the citizens 
that public decisions could not rely on any kind of scientific “truth.” In fact, the scientific 
controversies over dioxin risk were widely discussed in the media.  
The scientific uncertainty surrounding the effects of dioxin implied that the decisions 
taken in response to the crisis were not just technical, but political. Nevertheless, the public 
  
authorities insisted on denying uncertainty. No public debate involving the communities affected 
took place to define the problems to address in response to the contamination or how to address 
them. Nevertheless, conflicting definitions of the problems involved in responding to the crisis 
emerged. This happened through the mobilization of the people affected and of national social 
movements, resulting in contentious public controversies.  
In particular, one controversy was centered on the question of whether potential 
malformation of embryos caused by dioxin should be prevented through abortion. In fact, 
abortion rapidly became the central issue in the national public debate concerning the dioxin 
effects in Seveso. In this debate, the Catholic Church, whose influence was very strong locally, 
opposed left-wing movements. Other controversies concerning the uncertainty of long-term 
dioxin health effects slipped into the background. The centrality gained by the abortion 
controversy largely explains the shift of the dioxin risk from being a public health problem to a 
moral-cultural problem.  
Another controversy contributing to this same shift was related to the issue of what should 
be considered “safe.” The public authorities defined safety by starting from the detached 
standpoint of experts and laboratory science. In this view, safety is the condition of not being 
exposed to risk and so displacement from the contaminated area was considered the solution 
guaranteeing the highest level of safety. Local committees of Seveso citizens supported a 
different definition of safety. They argued for the relevance of a specific risk: that of the Seveso 
community disappearing as a result of the way the public authorities were responding to the 
contamination. This response sought to preserve not only individual safety but also the 
“attachment to the territory” that was shared by the population affected in terms of being a 
community. This attaccamento al territorio (attachment to the territory) refers to the feelings of 
  
familiarity with people and spaces held both individually and collectively by the inhabitants. This 
familiarity is acquired over time, through the everyday experience of living together in a specific 
place, and is transmitted from one generation to the next.  
Attachment to the territory also refers to the fact that place is considered a constituent of 
the collective and individual identity, at the same time bearing the traces of a specific way of 
organizing individual and collective life. It thus refers to both active participation by the territory 
in shaping social life and at the same time the shaping of the territory by the activities of the 
community inhabiting it (Berque 2000; Breviglieri 2002; Thévenot 2006).  
Arguing for the relevance of attachment to the territory as a public good to be preserved 
while responding to the dioxin crisis, the local Seveso committees found themselves opposing 
not only the public authorities but also the national social movements mobilized in Seveso to 
support the victims. 
Social movements already active in the Italian political scene on the issue of 
environmental health, together with left-wing political parties, mobilized in Seveso. They 
organized a Scientific Technical Popular Committee (STPC) to help those they considered 
“victims” obtain justice for their suffering. One of the most important actors in this movement 
was Medicina Democratica (MD).
10
 For MD, the Seveso disaster required a large coalition of 
citizens and workers to impose the issue of environmental health on the political agenda. The 
concept of environmental health involved health damage caused by industrial production both 
inside and outside plants. Underlying this, there was a discourse of social criticism of capitalist 
exploitation (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). Capitalist exploitation entailed “hidden costs”—
“hidden” because of the control exerted over scientific knowledge production by hegemonic 
forces. MD’s struggle was oriented toward democratizing the production of knowledge to make 
  
those responsible for the negative consequences of industrial society socially accountable.  
The call for widespread mobilization of the people affected by the contamination and their 
participation in the production of knowledge about dioxin damage found little response from 
Seveso’s population, thus reducing the critical force of MD’s public arguments.  
This lack of support from the affected people can be explained if we consider that MD 
interpreted the dioxin contamination in Seveso and its effects in terms of criticizing capitalism. 
The Seveso disaster was considered a typical “capitalist crime” (Maccacaro 1976). What was 
happening in Seveso was a clear example of capitalist injustice, which needed to be denounced. 
The Seveso people were being asked to join the preexistent cause of the workers and their class 
struggle. There was no place for more local or even personal definitions of the issues at stake in 
the disaster situation. In this respect, the activists were as incapable as the public authorities of 
understanding what mattered to the Seveso people in responding to the dioxin crisis.  
For a large majority of these people, the priority in responding to the crisis was to 
maintain their previous way of life, to preserve the specificity of the relationship between their 
community and their territory—but neither the public authorities nor the left-wing activists were 
able to take this dimension of attachment to the territory into account.  
The scientific uncertainty about dioxin risk implied that no clear evidence was available to 
support the public authorities’ and social movements’ interpretation of the dioxin risk. Appealing 
to this uncertainty, a grassroots mobilization of strong Catholic background took shape and urged 
the public authorities to consider not only the seriousness of the health risk but also the fear that 
Seveso as a community might disappear. The collective damage caused by dioxin was thus 
interpreted as damage to the community. However, the public authorities opened no arenas for 
public discussion of these issues, and neither did they propose any mediation. This caused the 
  
grassroots movement to radicalize its protest. This radical turn became visible in the central role 
assumed within it by the militants of the Catholic movement Comunione e Liberazione (CL). For 
CL, the disaster was not a “crime,” but a “test” of the community’s ability to stick together, and 
to its values, in responding to the crisis. CL asked the public authorities to recognize a right of 
the local community to self-organization in its response.
11
 
This interpretation of the dioxin damage as a cultural threat to the community and its 
values contributed to obscure the controversial implications of the contamination: those 
jeopardizing community cohesion and in particular the long-term health effects. Moreover, the 
way the Swiss multinational corporation Roche managed compensation to the victims in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster also contributed to downgrading the public health 
consequences to the level of personal problems. The compensation issue was dealt with through 
instruments of private settlement in the form of individual contracts agreed on between victims 
having suffered material losses and the multinational corporation. No public discussion took 
place on how to compensate for the negative consequences of the disaster that were to be 
expected in the future.
12
  
 
<HDA> Long-Term Dioxin Health Effects in Seveso: A Scientific Problem, an Invisible 
Public Health Issue  
<FL> The interpretation of dioxin as a threat to the community instead of a public health 
problem led to a situation in which scientists alone were left in charge of exploring and assessing 
the health consequences of the contamination.  
The design of the research on dioxin health effects was heavily influenced by laboratory 
science and by the controversies surrounding the carcinogenic effects of dioxin. There was no 
  
involvement of the population affected in terms of participation in the production of knowledge. 
Furthermore, the people affected never asked to be directly involved in the design of this 
scientific research. 
As Wynne (1996: 52) remarks, an absence of criticism of expert knowledge does not 
automatically equal trust. The relationship between lay people and experts is in fact ambivalent: 
dependency and lack of agency might both explain lack of voice. In the case of Seveso, the 
dioxin damage was interpreted by the population affected as a cultural threat affecting a 
community. This is an important dimension that should be taken into account to understand why 
dioxin never became a public health issue in the area affected. At the same time, the case of 
Seveso tells us much about the specific kind of knowledge that is assumed to be relevant in the 
debate over toxicants and carcinogenesis, and is consequently funded and supported by research 
institutions and public agencies that are looking for solid evidence to guide regulation.   
Today, research on dioxin effects has partially assessed the damage from the 
contamination in Seveso, revealing that it is not limited to cancers but also includes 
transgenerational effects, in particular, thyroid dysfunction linked to maternal exposure 
(Baccarelli et al. 2008). Nevertheless, the scientific controversies remain acute because the 
Seveso data are insufficient to establish clear-cut cause-effect relations.  
For science, dioxin is still an incomplete jigsaw puzzle because of the complexity of the 
mechanisms of its interaction with the human body. As Douglas (2004) notes, dioxin challenges 
current models for assessing the carcinogenicity of toxicants and shows how regulating toxicants, 
relying on carcinogenic effects, cannot be just a matter of uncontroversial scientific evidence. 
This uncontroversial scientific evidence is a chimera and conceals decisions made by scientists 
(in terms of research priorities, or of data excluded as irrelevant) in order to reduce uncertainty 
  
(Latour 1987). Uncertainties about toxicant carcinogenicity abound, and they are related to the 
complexity of the interactions involved when investigating carcinogenesis. Nevertheless, the 
dominant paradigm, which explains carcinogenesis on the basis of one single factor accounting 
for its insurgence, is still the reference point for defining what knowledge should count for 
regulation. 
Despite being widely mentioned in the literature concerned with dioxin carcinogenicity, 
the Seveso population shows no interest at all in knowing more about how this knowledge is 
produced and what it means in terms of the consequences for public health. It sees scientists as 
“people who made their careers exploiting our misfortune and using us as guinea-pigs.”
13
 To 
quote Massimo Donati, a family physician in Seveso who personally spent ten years trying to 
organize dioxin victims to start a legal action against Roche:  
<EXT> You cannot speak about all the scientific results concerning dioxin effects here in 
Seveso. It is a taboo: public administrators and citizens don’t want to speak about it. I’m 
in contact with Seveso people on an everyday basis, because of my activity as a 
physician, and I can tell you that people are divided in two categories. You have people, 
the large majority, who don’t care about dioxin, because they are fine or because they 
were not exposed. Then you have people who were exposed to the dioxin contamination 
and who are now sick: immediately they ask if dioxin could be a possible cause of their 
disease. It would be necessary to organize an epidemiological study in parallel to those 
already in place with the data collected by family physicians, with a geographical 
representation of the distribution of pathologies. This is necessary to see if there are 
localized concentrations of pathologies.
14
  
What Donati complains about is the fact that the scientific output on the dioxin effects in 
  
Seveso focuses exclusively on issues and questions defined within the generalized detached 
frame of understanding how dioxin (in general) interacts with the human body (in general). This 
is the kind of research promoted and funded by public and private actors, “because then you can 
publish your article in a scientific journal. But I need knowledge on dioxin effects that allows me 
to act for public health in this area, and this kind of knowledge is lacking.”
15
  
There is no link between the scientific work on dioxin effects based on the Seveso case 
and the territory of Seveso. First of all, no epidemiological research has been done starting from 
health concerns defined as such within the area, such as for example the perceived presence of 
possible anomalies in the concentrations of pathologies reported by isolated actors (physicians, 
ordinary citizens). Second, there is no link between the epidemiological studies on dioxin in 
Seveso and the implementation of preventive action in terms of public health in the area affected 
by the disaster. Donati’s idea of starting an epidemiological study using the geographical area as 
the central reference point (rather than the individuals exposed according to risk zones) has not 
found support, either from the regional authorities or from the population.  
In fact, the epidemiological studies on the effects of the dioxin contamination in Seveso 
are mainly focused on using the Seveso case to explore the biochemical mechanisms through 
which dioxin can affect human health. It is not by chance that these studies have focused 
progressively on the populations of the three risk zones. This population is in fact of particular 
scientific interest because it was exposed to high concentrations of pure dioxin with no other 
relevant forms of exposure to toxic sources. Data concerning the ICMESA workers and the 
workers employed in the decontamination activity were only collected until 1985. In this case, 
other kinds of exposure might severely interfere with the dioxin exposure, making this cohort 
scientifically less interesting. This fact reveals the specific logic that underlies the 
  
epidemiological research on dioxin exposure in Seveso: to identify the specific way in which 
dioxin interacts with the human body by trying to “purify” this effect from possible interferences 
related to situations of multiexposure. We can define this logic as a laboratory logic. It is 
detached from the territory and it is focused on the interaction of the toxicant with a partially 
decontextualized human being. It is considered fundamental to defining the forms of regulation 
that should be applied across different contexts.  
The aim here is not to say that a “health disaster” went unnoticed in Seveso because of the 
incapacity of the laboratory logic dominant in epidemiological studies to detect it, but rather to 
highlight how the knowledge produced on the dioxin effects in Seveso is based on a very specific 
model of the production of epidemiological data. The issue to be discussed is the consequences 
of this lack of pluralism in the epidemiological investigation into dioxin effects in Seveso.  
In fact, a problem of environmental health such as the dioxin contamination caused by 
ICMESA can be explored by starting with at least four different and complementary 
epidemiological approaches: a molecular approach, an individual approach, an approach in terms 
of population, and an approach in terms of ecosystem (Pekkanen and Pearce 2001). In the case of 
Seveso, the epidemiological studies were first driven by an individual approach, studying the 
individuals living in the risk zones. They then evolved toward investigations exploring the 
molecular mechanisms involved in dioxin toxicity. As previously stressed, there has been no 
epidemiological study defined in terms of studying the present state of the area affected by the 
disaster, looking at the pathologies observed, rather than exclusively following the individuals 
living in the risk zones defined in 1976.
16
 The problem involved in relying exclusively on 
epidemiological studies interested in exploring environmental risks at the individual and 
molecular levels is that of disconnecting epidemiological studies from a public health goal, from 
  
the production of knowledge useful for prevention on the territory in a locality (Pekkanen and 
Pearce 2001). The rules prevailing in the scientific community thus create a space for debate that 
is autonomous in a way, that is, it is guided by hypotheses, methods, and investigation 
procedures defined as such within a specific paradigm of knowledge in which the individual 
(with her genes, her behaviors) is considered the reference point.
17
  
The Seveso case shows how the prevailing model in the debate concerning the effects of 
toxicants on human health and regulating them is that of looking for a direct cause-effect 
relationship in terms of carcinogenicity, assuming the individual as the reference. In doing this, 
by limiting itself to the pursuit of knowledge relevant to global regulation and legal norms for 
compensation (both dominated by the logic of univocal cause-effect), epidemiology seems to 
abdicate the role of also providing knowledge relevant to acting to guarantee public health in the 
areas at risk.
18
  
 
<HDA> Final Remarks 
<FL> The dioxin contamination caused by the ICMESA accident has never emerged in the area 
affected as an issue of environmental health. This can explain the specific direction taken by the 
epidemiological research on long-term dioxin effects in Seveso, which was mainly guided by a 
laboratory logic (focused on carcinogenesis) but not connected with a prevention logic. Although 
this laboratory logic may be crucial for setting regulation standards, as the Seveso case shows, 
ongoing controversies can lead research to be monopolized by the internal logic of these issues 
and to reduce to marginality, to the point of complete obscurity, any perspective oriented toward 
the production of knowledge of use in implementing actions beneficial to local environmental 
and public health.  
  
The absence of involvement by the citizens affected in the production of knowledge about 
dioxin effects is crucial for explaining how research on the dioxin effects in the Seveso area 
developed and progressively detached itself from the territory.  
We have tried to explain this lack of citizen involvement by linking it to the interpretation 
given to dioxin risk by the grassroots groups mobilized following the ICMESA disaster. In 
particular, dioxin was seen as a threat to the very existence of the community. The fact that the 
public authorities opted for an authoritarian approach to managing the crisis increased this fear. 
At the same time, the movement for environmental health active in Italy in the 1970s took a 
highly ideological approach to the disaster situation. This created difficulty in integrating into its 
agenda the point of view of the victims and their fears concerning the disappearance of Seveso as 
a community. The centrality acquired by the issue of therapeutic abortions highlights the 
conflicting values that became an obstacle to the dialogue between the population affected and 
the activists. Moreover, we should not overlook the contribution by Roche to the 
individualization of the dioxin damage in reducing its attention to the dimension of material 
losses. 
No “uneasy alchemy” (Allen 2003) among citizens, activists, public authorities, and 
scientists took place in the aftermath of the disaster, thus causing the issue of dioxin as a problem 
of public health to become progressively invisible in the public space.
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 Dialogue among these 
groups seems in fact to be a necessary condition for the production of knowledge about 
environmental health problems that can help the design and implementation of prevention 
policies at a local level.  
The dioxin disaster was a moment of high visibility of the hidden costs of industrial 
production in terms of environmental and human health. Nevertheless, in the area affected, 
  
environmental health never became an issue. The Seveso disaster turned out to be, paradoxically, 
an event that contributed to the invisibility of the issue of environmental health in the heavily 
industrialized Brianza Milanese area. This should make us aware of the difficulties that are 
always present in the construction of environmental health issues as public problems. 
 A lesson we can learn from the Seveso case is the central role of public participation in 
decisions concerning how to respond to environmental risks arising from toxicants. When public 
authorities rely exclusively on experts to define what a risk is, and what the priorities should be 
in responding to it, they fail in their role to aid the collective construction of the specific risk as a 
public problem. They fail to take into account the existence of the different concerns the risk 
raises at the local level and the different kinds of knowledge that should be considered legitimate 
in shaping the orientation of research. An absence of participation results in turning the risk into 
an external object that communities are not able to appropriate and turn into an actual concern. 
This risk “externalization,” in turn, heavily affects the kind of knowledge produced about the risk 
itself, promoting a vicious circle of separation between knowledge for global regulation and that 
relevant to local situations.   
Joint involvement of citizens, activists, scientists, and public authorities is necessary in 
order to promote the production of knowledge about environmental risks related to toxicants that 
is not exclusively guided by laboratory logics but that seriously takes into account the local 
dimension of environmental health. In this process, the role of public authorities of guaranteeing 
the conditions for participation is crucial. Power inequalities have a key effect on the process of 
making things visible. These inequalities have to be addressed in order to create the conditions 
for collectively dealing with the harmful consequences of industrial activities.  
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<HDA> Notes 
                                                
1. The compound 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (TCDD) is produced as an unwanted by-
product in various chemical reactions and combustion processes, including the manufacture of 
chlorinated phenols and derivatives.  
2. Milena Sant, speaking about her experience in Seveso at the public event organized  by the 
feminist group Maistat@zitt@, “Topo Seveso. Produzioni di morte, nocività e difesa ipocrita 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
della vita.” 14 April 2007, Milan. 
3. The analysis I develop in this contribution is based on my Ph.D. research on the collective 
responses to the Seveso disaster (Centemeri 2006). The research was designed to investigate the 
legacy of the ICMESA accident in the community affected through historical analysis of the 
1976 event and an ethnographic study concerning the ongoing construction of a collective 
memory of the disaster, namely, the project “Bridge of Memory” run by a group of local 
activists. The data discussed here were collected through the analysis of documents, interviews 
with people affected by the disaster, local activists, representatives of public institutions, 
scientists, and participative observation of events related to the legacy of the disaster.  
4. Stavros Dimas, Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Environment, 
“Seveso: The Lessons from the Last 30 Years,” European Parliament, Brussels, 11 October 
2006, SPEECH/06/588. 
5. A question that remains open is the doubt concerning the true destination of the TCP produced 
by ICMESA in the early 1970s. According to journalist Daniele Biacchessi (1997), it was 
transported to the United States and used in the production of chemical weapons for the Vietnam 
War.  
6. The air emission originated from a TBC (1,2,3,4-tetrachlorobenzene) alkaline hydrolysis 
reaction vessel of sodium 2,4,5-trichlorophenate, an intermediate compound in the preparation of 
trichlorophenol. The direct cause of the emission was excessive pressure induced by an 
exothermic reaction in the TCP vessel, which occurred a few hours after suspending operations 
and caused the disk of a safety valve to break down: the disk broke when the pressure reached 4 
atmospheres at 250°C, and TCDD—together with the above-mentioned products, and with 
ethylenic glycol and soda—burst out of the roof and spread directly in the air due to the lack of 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
an expansion chamber (Ramondetta and Repossi 1998).  
7. The mixture inside the vessel at the moment operations were suspended was probably 
composed of about 2,030 kg of sodium 2,4,5-trichlorophenate (or other TCB hydrolysis 
products), 540 kg of sodium chloride, and over 2,000 kg of organic products. In recovering the 
vessel, 2,171 kg of material, mainly sodium chloride (1,560 kg) were found. It can therefore be 
concluded that the air emission, composed of a mixture of several different pollutants including 
dioxin, was about 3,000 kg. As for the dioxin content in the toxic cloud, technical literature 
reports different evaluations, ranging from 300 g to 130 kg (Ramondetta and Repossi 1998). 
8. In zone A (108 hectares, 736 inhabitants), the authorities decided on the evacuation of the 
whole population; in Zone B (269 hectares, 4,600 inhabitants) there was no evacuation, but the 
inhabitants were forced to follow strict rules of conduct; in the Prevention Zone (1,430 hectares, 
31,800 inhabitants) there was no evacuation but inhabitants were forced to follow some 
precautionary rules of conduct, less constraining than those in zone B. 
9. Voluntary pregnancy terminations were finally permitted in Italy by law 194 in 1978. 
10. Medicina Democratica (Democratic Medicine) was an Italian social movement born in the 
1970s on the initiative of industrial workers, scientists, and intellectuals. MD argued for the 
importance of developing participative forms of knowledge production on health problems 
related to industrial activities. 
11. Comunione e Liberazione is a Catholic movement born in Italy in the 1950s and particularly 
active in Lombardy. Its main trait is the charismatic dimension that goes with the promotion of 
what are called opere, that is, the supply of social services through associative organizations. The 
relationship between CL and the state has always involved a measure of conflict. In the opinion 
of CL, the state cannot and ought not take part in social organization: “The welfare State must 
  
                                                                                                                                                       
limit its intrusion into people lives” (Abruzzese 1991: 171). On the “fundamentalism” of CL, see 
Zadra (1994). 
12. The compensation issue remained open in Seveso until 2007, when the two proceedings 
instituted against Roche on the initiative of two groups of dioxin victims were declared invalid as 
a result of the statute of limitations. The two groups of victims never succeeded in gaining local 
support for their initiative (Centemeri 2006: 135–58). It is important to note that Roche has never 
admitted its responsibility for the disaster in any court of law. 
13. Interview with L.S., resident of Seveso (April 2004). 
14. Interview with Massimo Donati (June 2004). 
15. Ibid. 
16. As Barbara Allen remarks in her study on the mobilization of citizens for environmental 
health in the Louisiana “chemical corridor”: “by placing the specific resident or community at 
the centre of an investigation, science is constructed around what is happening to the people, 
rather than people being constructed to fit mathematical scientific models” (Allen 2003: 148). 
17. For a critique of this approach in the field of job-related cancers, see Thébaud-Mony (2007). 
18. On this point see also the chapters of Barbara Allen and of Paul Jobin and Yu-Hwei Tseng in 
this volume.  
19. Another case of this virtuous alchemy is discussed by Paul Jobin (2006) in his study of the 
Minamata disease.  
